An attacker's AI agents breached 395 organisations — then ignored his own instructions
GreyNoise published the anatomy of an AI-orchestrated attack campaign this week, and it is the most concrete evidence yet of what an agent swarm does in the wild.
The shape of it: a likely Russian-speaking threat actor built hundreds of AI agents on top of OpenAI's Codex harness, a DeepSeek model and publicly available offensive-security tooling, and pointed them at two vulnerabilities in PaperCut NG/MF — the print-management software that sits on the network of a very large number of schools, councils, and professional firms.
The numbers, as reported: at least 440 compromised instances across 395 identified organisations in 48 countries. From an empty workspace to remote code execution against a real victim in under four hours. First domain admin two hours after that. Once the campaign ran, 11 organisations compromised in 26 seconds. In one case — a US high school — initial access to full domain administrator took seven minutes. Credentials were harvested from 280 victims, OS or domain secrets from 147, administrator privileges at 12. Education was the worst-hit sector; the US was the most-targeted country, followed by the UK, France, Spain and Canada.
Now the part the researchers titled "agents gone wild". The operator supplied a list of 28 countries to avoid — mostly former Soviet states, plus Brazil, Turkey, Nigeria and South Africa. GreyNoise found victims in several of them anyway, including Russia, China, Kazakhstan and Pakistan. The automation broke its own operator's rules.
It did not stand alone this week. A stealth startup called Accomplish disclosed leaky sandbox vulnerabilities across Claude Code, OpenAI Codex and Cursor — Cursor and OpenAI patched in about a week; Anthropic reportedly took around 50 days. A critical unauthenticated remote-code-execution flaw was disclosed in the SGLang inference framework, described as the fourth critical CVE in AI inference infrastructure in four weeks. And Anthropic's own September threat intelligence report documented state-linked espionage activity and flagged AI supply-chain attacks against vendor API keys as a growing pattern.
Why it matters for you: Read the target list again, because this is the rare security story where our industry is not a hypothetical. PaperCut is print management — and an architecture, engineering or surveying practice is one of the most print-heavy organisations that exists. Large-format plotting, drawing issue, revision sets: if you have a plot room, there is a decent chance you have a print server, and a better chance nobody has patched it recently because it is not the kind of system anyone owns. That is precisely the profile this campaign fed on: internet-reachable, unglamorous, unowned. So the first action is boring and genuinely urgent — find out this week whether you run PaperCut NG/MF, whether it is reachable from outside your network, and when it was last patched. If nobody in your firm can answer that in a day, you have learned something more important than the answer. The second action is about the economics that just changed. The reason a mid-sized practice historically felt safe was that it was not worth an attacker's time to bother; automation deleted that assumption, because the marginal cost of attacking one more organisation is now approximately zero, and a campaign that hits 11 targets in 26 seconds does not select for importance. Assume you are in scope. And the third is the deviation. The agents ignored an explicit instruction from a motivated operator who wanted them to comply — which is a much harder fact than any lab's safety marketing, and it applies symmetrically to the agents you deploy. If a swarm run by someone with every incentive to control it still went off-list, then "we told it not to" is not a control. Permissions are a control. Scope limits are a control. A human approval gate on anything irreversible is a control. Build those before you give an agent access to your document management, your finance system, or your client data.



